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In my PhD thesis, I am interested in the sociology of the electorates of populist-radical-right 
(PRR) parties in continental Europe. As a part of the EUROGLOB project, I am conducting 
four weeks of qualitative field research in which I am interviewing “local-level experts” (party 
activists, in particular campaigners, unionists, etc.) about the German PRR-party AfD’s 
electorate in the two electoral circumscriptions where the party has yielded its highest results 
in the September 2017 national parliamentary elections in the country’s post-socialist East 
respectively the West. These are the district of Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge in 
Sachsen, East Germany, and the city of Gelsenkirchen in the Ruhrgebiet, West Germany. I 
have defined a specific social group – people who switch their vote between left-wing parties 
(major left SPD, radical left DIE LINKE) and the AfD – and two specific political issues of 
interest – “social justice” and “globalisation”. It is the way in which questions relating to these 
issues are narratively framed by the PRR’s voters that is interesting to me (rather than simple 
pro/contra positions).  
In early May 2018, I have realised two weeks of field research in the district of Sächsische 
Schweiz-Osterzgebirge (SOE), a rural district south of the city of Dresden in the Bundesland 
of Sachsen, East Germany. The AfD has here yielded her highest result federally, in a jump 
from 7% to 35% over the period of four years, and won the district. SOE has a particularly 
strong local AfD-organisation which is a driving force in the transformation of the federal AfD 
from a “national conservative” and economically liberal to a “radical-right” party with a pro-
social (welfare chauvinist) rhetoric. Frauke Petry, the AfD’s former party head and 
representative of the liberal wing, ran and won the election in this electoral circumscription – 
just before, in October, she left AfD and founded another political initiative. SOE’s AfD 
organisation was strongly involved in making Petry leave (I am citing the press speaker: “A 
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cleansing process.”) SOE having an extensive history of neo-nazism, the AfD has here 
amongst others absorbed 7% of the total vote share directly from the neo-nazist party NPD. 
In 14 days I have been able to interview a total of around 40 persons. This includes nine 
local politicians of the AfD (3), the conservative CDU (2), the LINKE (3) and the SPD (1) 
(district- or municipal-level politicians, party members who have done campaigning in the last 
federal elections, one mayor and one member of the state parliament), two unionists, one 
local journalist who has done all the reporting on the local AfD, two representatives of the 
district administration working on economic affairs and one of the Federal Employment 
Agency’s local centre, five representatives of local associations (sports, tourism, a theatre, 
an NGO dealing with multiculturalism and racism), two representatives of a local higher 
education institution, shopkeepers, the attendees of a shabby bar and the entirety of the 
parents present at a hiking trip of the first form of a local high-school on Sunday, to which I 
was kindly invited by the teacher who organised it. Also, I have observed live as a participant 
a large AfD-demonstration and liberal/left counter-demonstration in Berlin as well as the 
public talk of the Saxonian Ministerpräsident (head of federal state) Michael Kretschmer in 
one of the towns in SOE most notorious for its neo-nazist movement and AfD vote, which the 
CDU-politician has held as a part of a very early campaigning tour for the 2019 state 
elections. 
Hereafter, I am analysing the backgrounds to AfD’s landslide electoral victory in SOE – social 
experience, socio-political relations and policy feedback – before I am presenting my 
concrete results concerning vote switching, social justice, and globalisation. 
1. Social experience 
SOE today has 255.000 inhabitants. This is 20% less than in 1989, the year of German 
reunification. The population is disproportionally over-aged and ethnically highly 
homogenous: before the mass-inflow of refugees in 2015, 1% of regional residents were 
foreigners; meanwhile this number has risen to 2%. The nowadays elderly generation (65+) 
has experienced adulthood in DDR (German Democratic Republic, GDR) times and is 
marked, in one way or the other, by the experience of its authoritarian and socially solidaristic 
system. The generation that now counts 50-65 years of age has, thirty years ago, been the 
agent of political change – these are the people who crowded the streets when the Wende 
happened. This experience is today re-politicised in favour of populism (see below). The 
majority of AfD-activists are male and belong to the latter-named age group.  
Post-socialism in East Germany meant the sudden closure of large socialist industrial 
enterprises. SOE in the 1990s had unemployment levels of up to 20% – and this is the formal 
figure, not including those who made part of Arbeitbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, the provision of 
lowest-quality work by the German Federal government. The transformation of the DDR’s 
economy has generally been perceived as mismanaged by the Federal government’s 
agencies, not as radically mismanaged as e.g. in Russia, but as a sell-out of local assets to 
West-Germans. This perception is held by the quasi-entirety of the population, not only of 
SOE but also of the more cosmopolitan city of Dresden. 
The experience of the post-socialist socio-economy by the population can be categorised 
into three ideal types. One group of people – in the early 1990s, young people right after their 
graduation or qualified mid-aged professionals – has left the region, many of them to 
Germany’s economically flourishing South West (Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg). Another 
group has been able to profit from the new circumstances, e.g. by successfully founding their 
own business or attaining a position in public service. They have been given a name: 
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“Wende-Gewinner” (winners). The opposite, the “Wende-Verlierer” (losers) are a large group 
that had to (due to low professional qualification) or decided to (due to family, real estate 
ownership, or attachment) stay while facing economic hardship. Many of these latter people 
on the long run accepted jobs of a lower qualification or remuneration than they potentially 
could have under better regional economic conditions.  
Today, SOE’s economy is very small-structured, dominated by small enterprises in various 
domains of artisanship, construction, and notably, tourism. There are almost no industrial 
enterprises in the region. As a result, prices (housing, consumption goods) are very low, but 
wages are even lower – in a comparison of all German districts, SOE has one of the lowest 
wage levels.  
Education levels in the region are equally very low. The small-structured private wealth that 
has, during a lifetime of work and not rarely in a bad job, been built here is what I want to call 
“wealth remote from education”: no high professional qualification was required for its 
earning; a materialist business-mindedness and a culturally speaking lower-middle class 
private-property logic stands behind it. From a number of respondents in the region I have 
heard that they disapprove of the zeitgeist which sees higher education as the only way to 
make a career. If their children attend a Gymnasium in the region’s capital Pirna, they 
already move away from their village. Later they will necessarily go to study – at least to 
Dresden, if not further away – and then work outside of the region. 
SOE, located between the city of Dresden and the Czech border, it needs to be stressed, is 
an idyllic region in terms of its geography, nature, and architecture. It has a tradition of 
receiving tourists that reaches back into the 19th century: already Richard Wagner1 preferred 
it for his holidays and creative stays due to the beauty of the mountains and woods at the 
Czech border and the silence that could be found along the river Elbe. And this, already, sets 
the general theme. SOE’s inhabitants, and their predecessors, have been very immobile and 
have never received many immigrants – not even from the directly neighbouring countries. 
The high school class I went hiking with consisted to 100% of white, German children – 
something I had never seen in any of the Western European countries I have resided in 
since including the 1990s. The vast amounts of tourists received today are elderly 
conservative couples from other German regions. This leads to a very high number; I want to 
claim to a critical mass of elderly conservative people with a similar live experience being 
present in this region, talking about that “you cannot go to Dresden anymore, you will be 
harassed by foreigners in the streets,” and how the small number of city dwellers who have 
newly bought houses in the village do not fit into local community.2 
There is a certain amount of variance. The town of Tharand in the very West of the region 
SOE is home to the world’s second oldest university institute in forestry. A part of the local 
population here is (far) higher educated than the regional average, is more mobile, has a 
different culture and different values. Some of these people are engaged or work in local 
politics and administration and have contributed to facilitating communication about what is 
                                                          
1 As we know, the antisemitic composer of ultaconservative, mythically nationalist operas (“musical dramas”, 
“Gesamtkunstwerke”) glorifying archaic notions of masculinity, of battle, etc., aiming to “replace religion by 
art”, which later served as propaganda material for the Nazi regime (but of course still are among the greatest 
pieces of romantic music ever written – a statement that a Wagner-fan would respond to, “Remove the 
“among” and the “romantic”.). 
2 There is also a small but growing amount of climbing tourism in the region which i.a. brings young, socio-
politically “alternative” people into SOE. I have not been able to test at this stage if this, at specific spots of 
social contact and exchange, may produce an inverse effect. 
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going on during the large immigration of refugees in 2015, as well as between new immigrant 
and local resident groups: they carry a different political culture than the local population (by 
which, predominantly, such initiatives were not taken). Even more, local residents in Tharand 
may be used to a slight degree of ethnic and cultural mixture, having seen visiting students of 
a different culture, language, and physiognomy already during DDR times. Here we find 
SOE’s lowest AfD-election-result in 2017: 30%. The highest AfD-results – of around 40% – 
we find in the touristic, but economically and culturally very peripheral towns in the Eastern 
valley of the river Elbe (see below). 
Based on participant observation and -experience, I want to make a geographical 
classification of life-worlds – one that follows degrees of urbanity. When you take the train 
from the 500.000 inhabitants-city Dresden, a cosmopolitan centre of the arts and at least a 
federal one of the sciences, the political capital of the state of Saxony, one of only three large 
cities in the German East, to SOE’s district capital town Pirna, you cross a border of life 
worlds. The mode of living in Dresden is urban, it is indeed only by a small degree less 
metropolitan than e.g. in Berlin.3 Pirna has 40.000 inhabitants, is beautiful, quiet, features a 
small town centre with some cultural offer indeed of trans-regional relevance (but not 
transcending in relevance the state borders of Saxony). It is connected to Dresden as well as 
to the villages around it through the daily commuting of a substantial number of people of all 
ages for all purposes. It hosts a high number of hiking tourists. When you are a resident of 
Pirna, you are likely to own or rent on the long-term a house or apartment. You are likely to 
live with your core family. When you walk through the town-centre, you meet a number of 
people whom you know – possibly, whom you have known for a long time. You greet the 
shop keepers. You walk past many people whom you don’t greet, including people whose 
lifestyle is not yours, but if you see something that appears bizarre, not in order to you, you 
will stop and address the issue. You feel that this town is, not to an extremely rigid, but to a 
coherent degree, collectively yours. The mode of living can be described as town-ish and as 
suburban. When you take the bus from Pirna to one of the villages in SOE, you notice first of 
all that you should own a car. By no other means will you be able to make sure you arrive on 
time for your appointments. If you are a resident of one of these places, you live in a house, 
possibly with your extended family or not far from them. You have either inherited or built this 
house. You know the quasi-totality of the village’s inhabitants as well as their children, their 
parents, and you know where in the graveyard there grandparents lie. The only local 
institutions of trans-local relevance are the touristic sights and gastronomy as well as the 
commuting of some to Pirna or Dresden for work. The commute to Dresden, however, is a bit 
far and complicated, so that this latter group is likely to move (at least) to the suburban(ising) 
towns of Pirna, Bannewitz or Freital. If you live in the village, all creation of meaning, of 
                                                          
3 It is important to note that a so-conceptualised “metropolitan” or “urban” life world – in comparison to a 
“suburban/town-ish” and a “rural” one as described afterwards – obviously features the largest internal 
variance. Indeed it is defined by this huge variance of social experience in high geographic proximity. Whether, 
inversely, by a reasonable measure, a “metropolitan life world” features at all any points of coherence in 
collective experience – experiences that are shared, to a certain level of recognition and identification, by a 
large part of a city’s dwellers – is a pertinent question. One could argue that the continental European city, 
notably through welfare-state (type-of) provisions, has at least some of them: credibly, most of their residents 
make use of public transportation systems. This is not the case e.g. in Mumbai, where the middle classes 
systematically use cabs instead of the local trains. In this typology of social dis-attachment, North American 
cities would be found somewhere in the middle. I will stop here as it is rural, not urban sociology that interests 
me in this paper; also, much more has already been written about the latter (side question: why – and how 
does this relate to the rise of populism?). 
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purpose being shared and radically local, by every appropriate judgement, this place is 
organically yours.  
Sitting at the shore of the Elbe in one of the villages that I visited for interviews in the river’s 
Eastern valley (the Östliches Elbtal, close to the Czech border) is a memorable experience 
for me. I saw a picture that you would print on a postcard – sun, water, woods, houses built 
of Elbe sandstone. I heard complete silence, literally but for the mellow murmur of the river, 
and then a group of elderly German conservative lower middle class couples chatting (loud, 
they are German) while getting on a ferry boat operated by a local man who goes from one 
shore to the other in a 15-minutes frequency, 8 hrs a day. I felt – semantic void. Nothing of 
this spoke to me. Get me right, I adore hiking – but the last times I did it were in Kyrgyzstan, 
in Colombia, and in Ireland – which are places that interest me – and in Fontainebleau and 
the French alps with friends from Paris – who are people that interest me. While the 
experience of Pirna somewhat relates to that I have made growing up in a Lower Austrian 
small town, there was absolutely no reason for me to be in that village – except that in fact, it 
has the single highest proportional populist vote in all of Germany. 
I want to conclude two things from the preceding two paragraphs. Firstly, the here-described 
differences in life-worlds are not only relevant to superficial aspects of social experience. 
These worlds differ in core aspects of social existence: in the modes, in which life meaning is 
created.4 What is the meaning of life? – the question to which post-modern societies – and 
this is what defines them – do not offer a common, uniting answer, by us does not need to be 
explored normatively, but descriptively, sociologically. The goals that people set or follow in 
their lives, the types of social embeddedness and the experiences of social transcendence 
(Th. Luckmann) that give meaning to their lives, is my argument, at least in this case study 
differ significantly along the line of degrees of urbanity – which automatically overlap with 
age, education, and taste.5 (However, the urbanity dimension must be correlative rather than 
causal; possibly there is causation via a short effect chain.) Secondly, I want to formulate the 
hypothesis that the combination of, 1) this substantial difference in what superficially and 
possibly wrongly we might call “socio-cultural characteristics”, what better should be called 
“social experience” and most precisely, “worlds” or “worldliness”, and 2) the rupture of 
communication between them is a background factor to the success of populism among a 
specific part of its electorate. Hereby, I am not saying anything new on the surface: the 
significance of the urban-rural divide as well as of age and of education for populist voting 
(as well as for a “GAL-TAN-cleavage” or an “integration-demarcation cleavage”) have been 
shown time and again. I want to sharpen our understanding of how in detail this works – 
which, by the way, is the only way to understand what can be done about it. Our colleagues 
at Paris School of Economics, at Nuffield College, Oxford, and at the LSE International 
                                                          
4 Meaning creation … Sinnschöpfung. Possibly the use of the English word “purpose” would be better. 
5 In this very early report, I am not rooting my arguments in the literature. What I implicitly cite, using the 
chosen wordings, includes: Saskia Sassen’s classification of urban sociologies (“Global cities”); “social 
transcendence” in the phenomenological work of Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luckmann; “meaning” from Viktor 
Frankl’s psychotherapeutic approach of existential analysis. “Social experience” is a widely used and not strictly 
codified term in sociology. Phenomenology, generally speaking, is the discipline that qualitatively analyses 
individual experience. George Herbert Mead, although – or probably rather, because – departing from 
American pragmatism offers an interesting approach in connecting the two. Also, on the more fundamental 
side, James Dewey’s transactionalist social ontology (every human act is a “transaction” that involves an 
individual as well as its social environment) seems of significance here. A direction into which the here-begun 
theorising could move is the following: to what degree is the meaning that matters to your life – in two 
extreme cases – transnationally shared or localised? Possibly this conceptualisation could help us move beyond 
the confusion about in what way education, geographical mobility, and urbanity currently matter for politics. 
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Inequalities Institute are doing great work in measuring social inequalities in numbers. If we 
want to understand how inequalities matter for politics, and possibly if we want to understand 
what they are and how they matter at all, we must look at: 1) how they are experienced by 
people and 2) the ways in which different people communicate with each other. The latter is 
what I do in the next section. 
2. Socio-political relations and policy feedback 
Sachsen, and this includes SOE, has been governed by the conservative CDU ever since 
the Wende. As a rule rather than an exception, this long-term stability of power has produced 
corruption scandals, internal power fights, and most pertinently, high political arrogance. The 
former MP for SOE, even when the AfD’s party leader Frauke Petry announced she would 
run in this district in 2017, did not put more effort in campaigning than usually because he 
simply did not believe he could lose elections. The approach to politics that here is being 
punished – not in any way implicitly, but explicitly, people have actively and loudly demanded 
change for years – has generally been described to me as a “top-down” way of talking to 
people, as well as “not talking” to people. There is sparse evidence that generational change 
may overlap with “style” in the qualitative change in socio-political relations that is here 
underway; but there is also the CDU’s district member of state parliament who is in his mid-
20s and seems as far from the people (comfortably, plural and singular of this word are 
identic) and as involved with his own profit as it could get. 
The German Federal government has never since 1989 been seen by the local population of 
SOE as simply “their government”, but consistently as a type of “foreign”, at points even as 
an invading institution. The widespread perception is: there is no connection between local 
needs and Berlin’s politics. What I find is that this perception is founded at least on some 
solid ground.  
Infrastructure and education are among the region’s big problems. A general issue in current 
German politics, one of multi-partisan mobilisation, is: there are not enough kindergardens – 
because there is no money to run them. In Saxony, in addition, there is a lack of teachers – 
as a direct result of the low payment of teachers in the state. Young qualified people leave 
the state. While there is extensive commuting or migration of labour from Czech Republic to 
Bavaria or Austria, there is few to East Saxony – as the wages are not attractive “even” in 
comparison with Czech wages (given the named alternatives). SOE’s wage level is among 
the lowest of all German districts, but more importantly: many people here have a reason to 
fear poverty once they retire due to the proportionality principle of the German pension 
system – which, as the AfD stresses, can send a Federal public servant into retirement with 
3,000 euros monthly. In SOE, it can be 600.  
Since 2000, the river Elbe which runs through SOE has produced three serious floodings 
which have left damage to houses, infrastructure and the tourism industry and made a strong 
impression on the population. State and federal funds for reconstruction were vastly 
insufficient. This is among the first answers one gets when asking: “What has politics done 
well, what could politics do better?” It tends to be co-articulated with another issue: a 
significant part of the region lacks the infrastructure for mobile internet connection – speak, 
you cannot use internet on your cell phone – as no public investment has been made over 
years. In 2018, excluding a whole region from the world’s most favourite hobby (surfing on 
one’s cell phone) seems a sure way to alienate its inhabitants, to literally force them to ask: 
are we a part of … Germany? (This, evidently, is the nationalist articulation – which seems to 
win this articulation game. Another one would be: … of modernisation?) 
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The AfD’s district head, professional carpenter Egbert Ermer, tells me in a memorable 
moment of our extensive conversation:  
“The people would never have reacted so strongly to the refugees if they had not 
before that heard for years from all levels of politics: there is no money, there is no 
money. And suddenly, there was money.”  
“…. but for the others”, as the radical-right articulation then goes. And as is stressed again 
and again, the district had to take up debt for the management of refugee accommodation 
and integration, the state and Federal funds that were provided in a top-down process did not 
suffice. One was “left alone” with the “problems” while Merkel was making “big words” (CDU-
politician). Around 80% of people I talked to, among them educated residents of metropolitan 
Dresden, not at all only AfD voters, share these perceptions. This may have been the perfect 
preparation of the ground for welfare chauvinism – here, in an internal periphery of the global 
economic centre.6 
The number one reason, however, for why the AfD seems to be successful in SOE, is: they 
talk to the people. They are strongly represented personally sur place, in all the local towns 
and increasingly many of the villages. They are accessible. They talk to everyone. In their 
events, you can say “everything you think” (note the double meaning: you can equally be as 
racist, explicitly as “politically incorrect” as you want); in a CDU-event the politician will wear 
a suit, stand on a podium, and it is exclusively him7 who speaks. The point and the problem 
here is that as a matter of fact, the AfD is the only party who effectively talks to these people. 
When they propagate “The German government wants to replace its people” (read: through 
immigration, while usually, you would replace a bad government), almost no one believes 
this in the strict sense. However, it is the only slogan out there that communicates with, even 
if it disarticulates, the peripheral-rural experience of the people I talked to in the villages of 
the Eastern valley of the river Elbe, who all are huge football fans but had to close their 
football club because there are no more children in the village, why, because there is no 
more school in the village; who complain that their children do not want to continue their 
touristic enterprises that had been run for generations and not even to keep their houses in 
the village after the damages done by the flooding. Many of these people are not poor, they 
have built up a considerable bit of private wealth, often under hard conditions, over all of their 
life course, framed in a lower-middle class logic of private property with a fence around it and 
a low-educated aesthetic: car(s), large TV set, shopping with your car at a large supermarket 
including a lot of meat and Wurst, conservative clothing, holidays: hiking in Austria. It is not 
so much them individually, it is their local world as a whole which is in danger of going down 
the hill – and which many of them have decided to “defend”, by means of whichever vote and 
supporting whichever articulation – explicitly including: “Hol’ dir deine Heimat zurück” … 
“Take your homeland back” and “Zukunft Deutschland” … “Future: Germany”. Our analytical 
question must be: which other future effectively seems to be on offer for this group?  
                                                          
6 While “austerity politics” is the word that directly comes to my mind, summarizing this history of local-federal 
relations, the named AfD representative, interestingly, did not even know this word when I asked him back on 
it. 
7 No need, even, to gender this pronoun. 
 
 
8 
 
Saxonian political culture is traditionally marked by high interest for politics together with 
generalised distrust and specific distrust towards authorities – a “Kleingarten resistance”8 
type of characteristics that have become reinforced during DRR and that are now being re-
politicised, and it is important to note: both in pre-political forms of articulation – amongst 
people who do not recept PRR-discourse – and by the AfD-milieu of propaganda outlets. 
What may have been resentment has, explicitly, become revolt. This revolt can have various 
enemies – f. ex. “Antifa” and “links-grüne Gutmenschen”9 in an AfD framing. But what, once 
more, 80% of people I interviewed – this includes the entirety of AfD voters as well as CDU-
voters, left-wing-voters and, in particular, CDU activists and party members – agree on is that 
Angela Merkel is a problem. 
The small, crucial step from democratic backlash to populist revolt is what some perform 
privately in pre-political articulation and what the AfD blatantly propagates publicly. This is 
the assignment of sole responsibility to a principal opponent: in a process evolving since 
2015, that in May 2018 seemed to still be steering towards its peak, Angela Merkel has 
become the problem. 
What the young German PRR, the AfD, is successfully doing is not only to spur, but also to 
sit on top of, to monopolise this protest dynamic against the existing conditions.  
3. Vote switching and issues 
Syncretising the preceding pages-long building of understanding, I want to present in more 
concrete terms my results to the questions: who in SOE are the former left-wing voters who 
switch to the PRR? And what role do questions of social justice and of globalisation play, 
equally importantly, how are they narratively framed among the electorate? 
A large part of the new AfD voters are switchers from the conservative CDU or newly 
motivated non-voters. However, from 2013 to 2017 the populist left party DIE LINKE has lost 
10% of the total vote share – either to non-voting or the AfD. The neo-nazist party NPD’s 
vote of 7% has been absorbed by the AfD. Interestingly, the liberal FDP – a typical 
competitor of AfD – has as well won in this election. 
A typical explanation for the landslide switching from CDU to AfD is that people are as 
conservative as they used to be, but the party has become more centrist. This in mind, it 
however seems to be the protest directed at concrete policies and political styles that 
matters. This includes a long period of slowly increasing dissatisfaction plus a sudden uproar 
about the way how the refugee inflow was managed in 2015. At the moment, Angela Merkel 
is more and more becoming the protest’s main target. Possibly, when as a party you move 
your position, it depends on whether you move with the people or without the people: not 
only in terms of “spatial” position plotted in a chart, but also in terms of communication, 
relationality, and leadership. 
                                                          
8 Kleingartenvereine (allotment clubs) are a characteristicum of Germanophone life. A typical activity of 
conservative low-income strata (not seldom, a post-working class) it includes owning a very small garden 
divided by high fences from another 50 small gardens around it, sitting in this small garden for extended 
periods of time, drinking beer and disliking all of the 50 neighbours as well as immigrants to your country. 
Indeed, hissing German flags in your garden is one of the most common local ways in SOE of “patriotic” 
protest. In post-nazist Germany it is not common to be patriotic about flags except in football. Many of us see 
this as a cultural advancement that Aufarbeitung (the active dealing with history) has helped make, a step of 
cultural progress that other Western countries have not made (!). Moving this social line of acceptance 
“backwards”, of course, is one of the aims of nationalist activism – and for the time being this project seems to 
be successful. 
9 … „left-green humanitarians“. 
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The LINKE seems to in 2013 have collected a significant share of the general protest vote. 
These protest voters are distinct from the LINKE’s core electorates: elderly people socialised 
in the DDR, young highly educated people with explicit left-wing attitudes, and the poorest. 
After 2015, the direction of the general protest vote shifted towards a monopolisation by the 
AfD. A LINKE campaigner tells me how among people who came to his campaign stand in 
SOE there was but one pertinent question: “All that you do about social policy is great, I 
really support that. But why are you for immigration? […] I cannot vote for a party that 
supports immigration.”  
The NPD – AfD flow on a voter as well as on an activist level, interestingly (and maybe not 
even surprisingly) seems to shift the AfD’s socio-economic rhetoric to the left. 
Social difference and social justice, by all of my respondents in the region, is framed in a 
predominantly horizontal, not vertical way. The basic distinction, and this is the real 
experience they have lived through since decades, is the difference between German West 
and German East: the prior being advantaged over the latter. A much younger, and also 
horizontal, distinction is that between ethnic/cultural foreigners and locals/Germans. Not only 
is economic reality in Saxony a different one – and dis-attached – from that of Bavaria or 
Baden-Württemberg. In addition, Saxony is among West Germans generally laughed about: 
because it is peripheral, because of its specific mentality – both of these are then, usually, 
articulated around the issue of the Saxonian dialect (“Germany’s least sexy dialect.” – Note 
the pertinence of this innuendo suggesting reproductive ineligibility.) More recently, the 
strong Saxonian neo-nazi movement makes part of these stereotypes. Dichotomisation 
instead of communication leads to what it will always lead: in SOE, the phrase “If you speak 
Saxonian dialect, they anyway call you a Nazi” has become a vehicle of legitimising, of 
pushing the acceptance frontier of radical right attitudes and actions – along the line of 
collective opposition to the West, the metropolitan liberals, and the Merkel-government. 
Needless to say, these discursive vehicles also stabilise (neutralise) intra-group inequality: 
some of the richest entrepreneurs of SOE are now AfD-members. 
Globalisation is not an explicit issue of political competition or societal interest (although the 
district-head of the AfD answers my question about it: “This is … the biggest lie of the recent 
decades.”) In this part of the world, globalisation has mainly been experienced as the post-
socialist transformation of the economy, which has included sudden deindustrialisation. As 
said above, it was by a large societal majority perceived as mismanaged by the Federal 
government’s agencies; effectively, as an unjust sell-out of assets to Western Germans. It 
resulted in high unemployment and in SOE’s case, a population outflow of 20% (see above). 
It is just to argue that the articulation of this experience, and thus the political backlash to 
neo-liberal post-socialism – which is one distinct chapter of globalisation – is happening right 
now. 
 
 
 
